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Abstract 
Scientific research that requires space flight has always been subject to 
comparatively strong external control. Its agenda has often had to be adapted to 
vacillating political target specifications. Can space scientists appeal to one or 
the other form of the widely acknowledged principle of freedom of research in 
order to claim more autonomy? In this paper, the difficult question of 
autonomy within planned research is approached by examining three 
arguments that support the principle of freedom of research in differing ways. 
Each argument has its particular strengths and limitations. Together they serve 
to demonstrate particular advantages of scientific autonomy, but in the case of 
space science, their force ultimately remains limited. However, as the 
arguments highlight the interrelations between scientific autonomy, the 
democratic process and the collective interest in scientific knowledge, they 
suggest that a coherent and sustained space science agenda might best be 
ensured by increasing the transparency of science policy decisions and 
involving the democratic public. 
 
Space Science and the Freedom of Research 
It is befitting to begin a paper on scientific autonomy with a reference to 
Wilhelm von Humboldt. The words he used in an 1810 government 
memorandum on the organization of the academic institutions in Berlin were to 
be inscribed in the cultural memory of generations of German-speaking 
scholars and scientists. With regard to both the Preußische Akademie der 
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Wissenschaften (Prussian academy of sciences) and the university that was just 
in the process of being founded, he declared: 
These institutions can only fulfill their purpose if each of them, as 
much as possible, confronts the pure idea of science [Wissenschaft 1]; 
hence, solitude and freedom are the principles prevailing in their 
sphere. (Humboldt 1810, 255) 
Our interest in Humboldt's memorandum extends beyond this famous dictum. 
Not only does he stipulate the freedom of science from external obstruction; he 
explicitly postulates an obligation of the state to actively promote science. In 
doing so, says Humboldt, the state must always be aware 
… that it always hinders, as soon as it intervenes; that the matter as 
such would work infinitely better without it; and that actually things 
are just as follows: Since in a positive society, any extended activity 
requires outer forms and means, the state has an obligation to 
provide these also for the realization of science […]. (Ibid., 257) 
The idea did not prevail that the state would have to add an apology to each 
transfer of the required means for scientific inquiry. The principle of freedom of 
research, however, became widely acknowledged. In its outline for a German 
constitution, the 1848 constitutional assembly in the Paulskirche in Frankfurt 
adopted the proposition: “Science [Wissenschaft] and its teaching are free.” 
Friedrich Wilhelm IV took on the same sentence and included it the constitution 
he imposed on Prussia on December 5th, 1848, making the freedom of research 
a legal norm for the first time. Austria followed in 1867. (Cf. Schmidt 1929, 60–
77) 
Since then, the freedom of academic teaching and research has had a firm 
place in German and Austrian constitutional history. The present formulation in 
the German constitution is: “Art and science [Wissenschaft], research and 
teaching are free” (Grundgesetz article 5, sec. 3). But also outside the German-
speaking countries, some variant of the principle of freedom of research is often 
a pivotal point in debates about science policy or about research ethics. An 
extraordinary example of this is provided by the referendum on stem cell 
research held by the state of California in November 2004. It resulted in the 
Californian electorate accepting a law that seeks to establish guaranteed and 
autonomous stem cell research in their state and that contains the remarkable 
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declaration “There is hereby established a right to conduct stem cell research.” 
(Attorney General of the State of California 2004, 147, cf. Brown und Guston 
2005) 
However, juridical questions concerning the freedom of research are not 
the concern of this paper. Rather, I will pursue the question whether or not the 
claim that decisions about research projects should be made within the scientific 
disciplines concerned and in as independent a manner as possible can be 
justified. The justification at issue must be understood in a broadly normative, 
non-juridical sense. The question requires a closer look at the grounds of the 
principle of freedom of research, and an assessment of their strengths and 
limitations. As a particularly interesting special case of application, I will 
consider space science. By space science, I understand all scientific research that 
requires space flight (crewed or uncrewed). Can space scientists appeal to the 
principle of freedom of research to claim autonomy in their research decisions?  
Being “Big Science”, space science has been subject to comparatively 
strong political control from the onset. It may nevertheless make sense to 
inquire whether the case for freedom of research can be made even within space 
science. Firstly, space flight provides many illustrations of the claim that politics 
“always hinders” as soon as strategic decisions have to be subjected to its logic. 
German contributions to space science in particular have not infrequently been 
afflicted with incoherent political requirements and the ensuing half measures. 
An example is Germany's long-lasting see-saw between a European space 
policy and stronger transatlantic cooperation, which in the end contributed to 
the outcome that numerous European projects ultimately lacked the support 
required for successful completion while at the same time Germany never 
managed to outgrow the status of junior partner in its cooperation with the US 
and was therefore often forced to accept set-backs to its space science projects. 
(Cf. Weyer 2006 and Reinke 2004, chs. 4 and 5) 
Secondly, political requirements are to an ever-increasing degree leaning 
towards a concentration on application-oriented research goals. In space science 
as in other areas of the sciences qualms are growing that externally imposed 
aims more and more outbalance the research aims that result from the 
disciplines' own inner dynamics. A neglect of basic science is often feared to be 
the consequence. (Cf. for example Ziman 2003, cf. also Wilholt 2007, Adam, 
Carrier and Wilholt 2006)  
Is there a defensible principle of freedom of research that can serve to 
substantiate the claim that external instrumentalization of space science is 
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illegitimate and that society or the state is obliged to facilitate, as far as possible, 
the free exploration of space? That is the guiding question behind the 
considerations of this paper. 
But first it has to be acknowledged that this kind of question affords only a 
very selective perspective on space flight. From the state’s perspective, space 
flight serves not only scientific purposes, but also other tasks of the state. An 
important case is infrastructure policy, where the applications of satellite 
technology play an important role in areas such as communication, 
meteorology, navigation and geodesy. Military and security policy are 
obviously often important for governmental interest in space flight (and 
concern not only satellites but also rocket technology as well as the hypersound 
and re-entry technologies of space gliders), though they have been of lesser 
concern in recent German space flight policy. Nevertheless, in Germany and 
elsewhere, space-flight is a cross-sectional task, involving other functions of the 
state in addition to the encouragement of the sciences (cf. Spude 1995, ch. C). 
These functions may not always be separable, and this alone may already imply 
a fundamental limitation to the freedom of research in space science. 
Nevertheless, if there was a convincing argument that society or the state 
must sponsor the sciences in their free development, i.e. in their evolvement in 
all relevant directions and in accordance with the dynamics determined by the 
disciplines’ own development, and if said relevant directions included the 
research strands pursued in space science, then free choice of projects for the 
disciplines involved in space science should be stipulated at least within the 
leeway left by the other functions of space flight. The question remains whether 
a principle of freedom of research of the required form and strength can be 
justified. I will now outline three possible arguments for freedom of research 
and put them to the test with regard to their significance for the case of space 
science. It is, after all, far from self-evident that scientific research, in contrast to 
many other collective activities supported by society, should enjoy a guarantee 
of freedom. Why is it that research should be free? 
Arguments for freedom of research 
The argument from autonomy 
The first possible line of reasoning we have to consider is an argument from 
autonomy. It can be argued that knowledge is one of the basic requirements an 
individual needs in order to live a self-determined life. The individual must 
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therefore possess the right to acquire this knowledge, which implies the right to 
engage in inquiry. This connection between freedom of research and individual 
autonomy suggests itself most immediately with regard to Humboldt, who 
prominently emphasized the ethical value of autonomy: 
The true purpose of a human being – the one not dictated by 
changing affection, but by eternally unchanging reason – is the 
greatest and most well-proportioned development [Bildung] of its 
powers to a whole. Freedom is the first and indispensable condition 
of this development. (Humboldt 1792, 21) 
Surely such a principle of autonomy permits the derivation of an extensive right 
of the individual to conduct knowledge-oriented endeavors (as long as they do 
not conflict with other rights). For this reason, the argument from autonomy is 
even in our times still sometimes regarded as the central argument for academic 
freedom (cf. Putnam 1987, 45). However, the argument as such does not seem to 
entail more than that individuals should not be obstructed in their efforts to 
increase their knowledge. It can in no obvious way be concluded from the value 
of individual autonomy alone why society or the state must pick out some 
knowledge-oriented enterprises (viz., scientific research), acknowledge them as 
collective tasks, and actively promote their development. Yet according to a 
widespread understanding of the principle of freedom of research, it entails a 
claim to public support. To understand this important aspect, we have thus to 
consider additional arguments. 
The argument from democracy 
A second argument that might be called the argument from democracy holds 
promise of strengthening the principle of freedom of research. The democratic 
process presupposes, among other things, the citizens’ capacity to form well-
founded beliefs about the possible consequences of governmental and 
legislative decisions and to develop reasoned preferences among them. These 
tasks obviously require knowledge. Theorists of democracy have therefore 
derived a right to free inquiry from these presuppositions (Dahl 1985, cf. Brown 
& Guston 2005, 9). 
This second root of the principle of freedom of research also goes back at 
least to Enlightenment thought,2 as evidenced most strikingly by a report that 
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was submitted in 1792 to the Legislative National Assembly in Paris by the 
Marquis de Condorcet. He had been commissioned to propose ideas for the 
new organization of Science and Education in post-revolutionary France. In the 
report, he wrote:  
Finally, no public power must have the authority, not even the 
standing, to prevent the development of new truths or the teaching 
of such theories that contradict its particular politics or its present 
interests. (Condorcet 1792, 453) 
Accordingly, he suggests that entities which are independent from the 
government should be in charge of the appointment of professors, the oversight 
of textbooks, and similar things. He explains that the continuous progress of the 
republic calls for unremitting criticism, and that a public authority interfering 
with academic matters would thereby “contradict the purpose of the whole 
social institution: the perfecting of the laws.” (Ibid., 523) 
Today, the plausibility of an argument from democracy for freedom of 
research has rather increased. Participation in democratic processes now 
virtually always requires knowledge about complex affairs by far surpassing 
whatever knowledge might be produced by the citizens’ private research 
efforts. They are therefore reliant on knowledge institutions, including not only 
varied and independent media, but also a public science that must be largely 
independent from the government and from the parties involved in the political 
process. This independence must extend, not only to free communication of 
scientific knowledge, but also to independent decision-making concerning the 
inception and continuation of research projects. If, for example, citizens are to 
put trust into the findings of academic toxicology concerning the toxicity of 
certain substances, then academic toxicologists have to be able to select and 
carry out research projects in a way that is free from political interference. 
The bearing of the argument from democracy on the case of space science 
may be less obvious than in the case of toxicology. But a recent example can 
demonstrate the relevance. The administrators of NASA recently decided to 
halt a mission called Deep Space Climate Observatory (Lawler 2006a). The satellite, 
though almost completed, was put in moth-balls and might never be launched. 
The first plans for this mission had been set up during the time of the Clinton 
administration, when it had been strongly supported by vice-president Al Gore. 
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The satellite’s most important purpose would have been to provide reliable 
data about the earth’s changing albedo (i.e. its reflectivity of the sunlight). 
NASA explains that the costs for launching the satellite are too high, which is 
consistent with its large number of recent terminations of science missions for 
budget reasons (Reichhardt 2006a, Lawler 2006b). However, the earth’s albedo 
is one of the decisive and controversial quantities in the scientific study of 
climate change (Charlson et al. 2005). In view of the Bush administration’s well-
known stance on climate policy and its well-documented attempts to suppress 
scientific evidence for human-caused climate change (UCS 2005, 5–8), the 
relevance of the termination of the Deep Space Climate Observatory mission for 
the democratic process can not be easily dismissed. NASA’s decision may have 
been an act of anticipatory obedience or it may have resulted from a more 
immediate form of political influence – in either case the citizens’ interest in 
independent, robust knowledge was not served well. 
The argument from democracy is a strong argument in the sense that 
protecting the preconditions of the democratic process certainly deserves high 
priority. What may be questioned is the scope of a principle of freedom of 
research as supported by an argument from democracy. In order to support the 
well-informed and unmanipulated judgment of citizens with respect to political 
decisions, it may suffice to guarantee independent research decisions to the 
scientific disciplines only with respect to such projects that can be expected to 
result in politically relevant knowledge. This would certainly include projects in 
climate research, while mapping the stars, for example, does not seem to have a 
discernable relevance for the democratic process. (To be sure, it is always 
possible that research projects produce knowledge which then surprisingly 
gains previously unexpected relevance for seemingly unrelated matters. 
However, if the relevance is truly unforeseeable in advance, then there is also 
no danger of targeted manipulation through meddling with prior research 
decisions.) The argument from democracy is therefore a strong argument for a 
principle with limited scope – limited to research projects of political relevance.3 
The example of the Deep Space Climate Observatory shows that there are 
in fact cases of space science projects with foreseeable politically relevant 
results. Further examples surely can be found, especially in the area of earth 
observation. However, they contrast with a large number of projects that lie 
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clearly beyond the reach of the argument from democracy. The search for 
gravitational waves, the geology of Mars and the quest for dark matter may 
exemplify this point. It is noticeable that among the projects that do not seem to 
be able to derive a claim to autonomy from the argument from democracy there 
are particularly many that are less application-oriented and rather associated 
with basic science. Thus it seems that if there is any hope at all of countering the 
external instrumentalization of space science with a substantiated claim for 
freedom of research, it will have to rest on yet another argument. 
The argument from social epistemology 
Our common interest in knowledge evidently surpasses the realm of 
information that is immediately relevant for political decision. This insight 
might provide us with a starting-point for a rationale for freedom of research 
with greater scope. Beyond as well as within the political sphere, we need 
knowledge to approach practical problems efficiently. We also search for 
knowledge in order to explain the phenomena of empirical reality and 
understand our place within it. The sciences can be regarded as the 
institutionalized endeavor to produce, by means of a cooperative effort, this 
knowledge that would be inaccessible to the epistemic pursuits of individuals. 
All this is well, but it does not yet explain why a principle of freedom of 
research should apply within the coordinated knowledge-generating enterprise. 
Could not the cooperative effort be orchestrated by a centralized authority and 
work equally well (and perhaps better)? 
A riposte to this question that suggests itself is that organizing scientific 
inquiry on the basis of a principle of freedom of research is simply the most 
effective way to find as much relevant knowledge as possible in as quick and 
reliable manner as possible. I will call this way of justifying freedom of research 
the argument from social epistemology. Social epistemology is an emerging 
subfield of the theory of knowledge, whose core problem is, in the words of 
Philip Kitcher, “to identify the properties of epistemically well-designed social 
systems” (1993, 303). Is freedom of research one of these properties? 
The argument from social epistemology must show that the principle of 
freedom of research outclasses other possible forms of organizing research – in 
particular such forms as resort to the external control or planning of research. 
For this reason, the fallibility of all attempts to plan and control research has 
played a central role in many historical instances of the argument from social 
epistemology. An impressive (and sadly forgotten) example of this is given in a 
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lecture from 1711 by the philosopher and jurist Nicolas Gundling. In this 
address, much discussed in early 18th century Prussian academia, Gundling 
called for complete freedom of teaching and research for all four of the 
universities’ faculties – a shocking conception at the time. (Gundling 1711, cf. 
Paulsen 1896, 530 f.) To him, this was the only way to increase the stock of 
known truths, because to purposefully plan a faultless way to new knowledge 
was in his view impossible.  
Step by step must the summit of truth be scaled, which rises between 
a thousand rocks and shrubs of opinions, such that it is virtually 
impossible for even the most diligent not to slip here and there and 
collide and grasp false things, before they reach the place where 
there is no more occasion for erring and slipping. But now imagine 
that the erring were not tolerated, the deceived were suppressed, and 
the ones who had stumbled were trampled and chased away. Who 
could still ascend to that highest pinnacle of truth? Therefore, 
freedom must be conceded to reason. (Gundling 1711, 823) 
The inference from fallibility to the desirability of free inquiry gained potency 
and popularity through John Stuart Mill’s treatise On Liberty of 1859. Neither a 
person, nor a nation, nor a whole age can claim infallibility, says Mill. 
Therefore, an opinion may well be true while all contemporaries agree upon its 
falsehood. No opinion must therefore be suppressed, for this may possibly 
deprive mankind of an opportunity to exchange an error for a truth. (Mill 1859, 
21–23) 
Gundling’s and Mill’s considerations might be applied to the current 
matter of the freedom of research in the following manner. Prior judgments 
about the fruitfulness of research projects are generally fallible. Even projects 
that hold little promise of success from the point of view of the current scientific 
mainstream may therefore turn out to be groundbreaking. Consequently, 
scientists should choose their approaches and projects freely, such that a wide 
variety of approaches ends up being pursued. Some of them will prevail and 
lead to new knowledge, but it is impossible at any time to predict which ones 
these will be. 
This approach accords well with the wide-spread view that scientific 
innovation can not be planned. The very novelty of innovative ideas or methods 
obviously limits the possibility to deliberately bring them about. Michael 
Polanyi advocated this point vehemently: 
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You can kill or mutilate the advance of science, you cannot shape it. 
For it can advance only by essentially unpredictable steps, pursuing 
problems of its own, and the practical benefits of these advances will 
be incidental and hence doubly unpredictable. (Polanyi 1962, 62) 
Polanyi was outraged by proposals of John Desmond Bernal and other British 
socialist scientists to introduce strong elements of socio-political planning into 
the organization of science in order to increase the social benefits derived from 
it. His ardent defense of the freedom of research must thus be seen in the 
context of its time, as a strong reaction to the perceived endangerment of 
freedom by the Bernalists (cf. Mirowski 1997). But a proponent of the argument 
from social epistemology need not adopt Polanyi’s radical view that scientific 
progress can not be planned at all. The weaker claim that the planning of 
scientific progress is fallible and limited in its possibilities is already a promising 
starting point. The argument banks on the pluralism of scientific projects and 
approaches that evolves under conditions of free choice of projects and that 
counteracts the limitations and fallibility of planned procedure in the sciences.  
Social epistemology suggests that under conditions of free choice of 
research projects the meritocratic organization of the sciences brings about an 
automatic division of cognitive labor. Individual scientists are awarded 
scientific credit for coming up first with an important finding. In their quest for 
credit, they must therefore look out for a research project where their individual 
chance to achieve such a success is high. For example, a researcher might also 
switch to an apparent outsider approach, as soon as all the overrun mainstream 
approaches hold no more attractive prospects of individual success for another 
competitor. In this way, even unorthodox approaches will receive a share of the 
whole scientific effort. (Cf. Kitcher 1993, ch. 8) 
An advantage of the argument from social epistemology is that it holds for 
all disciplines that make an effort to produce new knowledge in innovative 
ways. Insofar as a strong common interest in this new knowledge exists, the 
argument can help to support the claim that there is an obligation of the public 
to facilitate free research within these disciplines by providing the required 
means. (The common interest in question may arise from the relevance of the 
new knowledge to the solution of our problems or to our understanding of the 
world and our place within it.) The argument is thus stronger than the 
argument from autonomy; at the same time, it has a wider scope than the 
argument from democracy.  
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Let us assume that the research projects of space science can be considered 
as pursuing knowledge that is at large in the common interest. Still, a difficult 
obstacle lies in the way of applying the argument from social epistemology to 
the case of space science. It is built into the kind of freedom of research that can 
be supported by the argument. The argument from social epistemology 
capitalizes on epistemic advantages that result from the pluralism of 
approaches which is brought about by the free competition of rivaling projects. 
The principle of freedom of research that is supported by the argument must 
therefore include free choice of projects on the level of research groups or even 
individual researchers in order to guarantee a pluralism of actually 
implemented approaches.  
In space science, it is doubtful whether this kind of pluralism can exist at 
all. The capacity of space flight is limited by its excessive cost, such that only a 
small number of selected projects can actually be executed. Like other areas of 
Big Science, space science is doomed to be planned science due to limited 
resources. (Note that the present situation in space science may foreshadow a 
more general future predicament of science organization, as innovative 
scientific research is generally becoming ever more expensive.) The resources 
for space science will always be subject to political deliberation and hence be 
limited not only by natural constraints. After all, the knowledge aims of space 
science are at best one matter of public interest among many others, against 
which they have to be balanced. In a world of scarce resources, free choice of 
research projects in space science on the level of research groups or even 
individual scientists is thus an unrealistic fiction. 
If any principle of scientific autonomy was to be applicable to space 
science, it would therefore have to be the kind of principle that operates on the 
level of disciplines (or even the scientific community) and stipulates that 
decisions about the inception and continuation of research projects must be free 
from extra-disciplinary (or extra-scientific) intervention. But this kind of claim is 
generally hard to justify – except maybe for the limited domain where the 
argument from democracy holds sway. It is far from obvious that intra-
disciplinary decisions more often achieve the goal of increasing the kind of new 
knowledge that is in the public interest than extra-disciplinary ones. It might be 
adduced that good decisions in planning research require concentrated 
specialized knowledge and competence, which is usually found rather within 
than without the scientific disciplines. However, that insight amounts to no 
more than a plea for competently informed research decisions. Decision-makers 
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should of course make use of the best expertise available, but that alone does 
not entail that the sciences must decide autonomously. 
Epilogue 
In January 2004, George W. Bush announced his Vision for Space Exploration. The 
declared goals of a new crewed moon mission and, as a superordinate aim, a 
crewed mars mission have massively changed the priorities of the American 
space program. Consequently, the new NASA director Michael Griffin had to 
execute cutbacks in many places of the budget (Reichhardt 2006a, Lawler 
2006b). NASA’s science missions are affected by the cutbacks to a 
disproportionately high degree, as was criticized by a report issued by the 
Space Studies Board of the National Academies (Space Studies Board 2006). The 
development of whole sub-disciplines, like astrobiology, might be stifled by the 
cutbacks (ibid., 30). Of course, space programs world-wide are affected by the 
American decisions. (In Germany, this was felt most clearly in the case of the 
infrared telescope Sofia, a cooperative mission of NASA and the German space 
agency DLR. In its budget draft for 2007, NASA had first unilaterally stalled the 
project. Only after vehement protests by the DLR and favorable technical 
reviews was the decision later reversed.) Many scientists are unsatisfied with 
the new American priorities and are skeptical about the scientific fertility of a 
new moon mission, especially as related to its costs. In an interview, Griffin 
commented on the discontent that is widespread among scientists. 
I have to draw the line when people say “I’m not interested in the 
Moon. I would rather put the money into studying the physics of the 
tropopause.” OK, great. Glad you have an opinion; everybody gets 
one. But the people who run the country have decided that we are in 
fact going to the Moon. It’s a question of what scientists would like to 
do with that. (Reichhardt 2006b) 
This attitude seems difficult to accept – not only from the perspective of the 
scientists involved in the slashed projects. But our search for ways to apply 
principles of scientific autonomy to the case of space science has produced 
mostly negative results. Does this ultimately mean that there remains nothing 
to be said against Griffin’s laconic statement? 
Such a resigned stance is not justified by the considerations presented in 
this paper. As the discussion of the argument from social epistemology has 
shown, the state’s duty to sponsor scientific research arises from the collective 
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interest in knowledge that could not be attained by the citizen’s private efforts. 
To do justice to this purpose of the public support for science, strategic 
decisions must in the first place adequately reflect the collective interest in 
knowledge. Secondly, they must make use of the best available expert 
knowledge in order to determine how best to realize this interest. One may 
speculate that some of the procedures that led to recent important decisions 
affecting space science lacked one or both of these requirements. 
A crucial problem is that science policy decisions are often achieved by 
processes of scant transparency to the public. In a democratic society, the public 
should participate in the determination of collective knowledge aims. In the 
absence of public attention, space science easily becomes a plaything for 
political agents who are dealing with aims and interests that have little or 
nothing to do with acquiring new knowledge, such as industry policy, 
international politics, military use, or propaganda. The incoherencies and 
instabilities in space science programs world-wide are not a consequence of a 
lack of scientific autonomy, but often result from a lack of democratic culture in 
science policy making. 
It is therefore of greatest concern, also to the scientific community, to 
frame decision-making processes in space policy in a more transparent way and 
to generate more public attention for them. It follows that if the space science 
community wants to substantiate its claim to reliable support for its own chosen 
research projects, then it can best do so by convincing the democratic public of 
the following three ideas: 
(1) That basic as well as application-oriented research in space science aims at 
knowledge which is of collective interest, 
(2) that only the sustained, stable and coherent support of space science 
programs can bring research closer to attaining these knowledge aims and 
(3) that procedures of decision-making that forego the best available expert 
knowledge, which can be found within the respective scientific disciplines, 
constitute an irresponsible handling of limited resources. 
Since it proves unfeasible to screen off the fate of space science from the sphere 
of politics by means of an appeal to a strong and sweeping principle of freedom 
of research, the future of space science will remain a political question through 
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